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ABStrACt
Based on an interpretation of the work of martin Heidegger, this article offers a shift away 
from social and cultural anthropology, which explores sociocultural aspects, and also from 
general anthropology, which aims to summarise all dimensions of human being. the author 
defines the specificity of existential anthropology: observing and conceiving human beings as 
they exist and continue to exist towards death. With a few twists in relation to Heidegger’s 
thought, the author discusses what is theoretically and methodologically at stake in this per‑
spective, opening existential anthropology to a large empirical field.
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existence cannot solely be presented as an effect of enunciation, of modes of 
perception or categorisation. In its singular and detailed expression, it is an 
extra, a leftover, not reducible to the groupings of the social sciences or to 
the effects of relations and trajectories. then what should be done with ex‑
istence in anthropology? Could the anthropological act start with making all 
beings strange, not necessarily through cultural distance, but based on a kind 
of astonishment and wonder at their presence? “the presumed soberness of 
mind and superiority of science become laughable when it does not take the 
nothing seriously” (Heidegger, 2010b: 56). Science, methods, descriptions 
and concepts come next.
In this article, my aim is not at all to explain martin Heidegger’s thought 
and proclaim loyalty (this point is crucial), but rather to help explain how 
an empirical and theoretical anthropology — an existential anthropology — 
can work on the human condition and its specificity. Heidegger, “wandler” 
(malabou, 2011: 9) of the anthropological tradition: why not? As we will 
see, this implies “converting” Heidegger, who was critical of the sciences 
in general and of anthropology in particular. Among those pages in which 
Heidegger’s philosophy confronts the demand for a “concrete anthropol‑
ogy”, some strong points will arise: singularity, existentials and the con‑
crete human being. Another key question will be raised: what makes hu‑
man beings exist as they do? these open onto a broad empirical space that 
anthropologists will have the task of deciphering. this view takes a certain 
distance from anthropology’s sociocultural tradition, as well as some reflec‑
tion on a definition of human beings as they exist with their characteristics, 
and on the epistemological issues involved in an existential anthropology of 
this kind.
DeFInItIOnS OF tHe HumAn BeIng AnD AntHrOPOLOgY
regarding definitions of the human being, Heidegger first presents at least 
two points of criticism. the first concerns the division into body, soul and 
spirit, which “designate areas of phenomena which are thematically separable 
for the sake of determinate investigations” (Heidegger, 2010a: 481). Heidegger 
responds that human beings cannot be the sum of these various character‑
istics, an animal material and a human material, corresponding to special‑
ised research. the second criticism concerns the error committed by ancient, 
Christian “traditional anthropology”, defining the human being as an animal 
rationale, a  “rational life” (Heidegger, 2010a: 48), a representation that had 
lasted a long time and still persisted instinctively, according to Heidegger, 
1  the page number refers to that indicated in the margin of the book.
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on the consciousness or the subject (Heidegger, 2010a: 49). Disputing the 
phenomenology of edmund Husserl, to whom Heidegger dedicates Being and 
time, he does not see the human being as a subject, person or spirit, giving 
rise to an anthropology that emphasises “consciousness” and the “context of 
experience” (Heidegger, 2010a: 49).
then what, according to Heidegger, constitutes their unity, their “total‑
ity”? In what currently constitutes anthropology, human specificity relates 
to a social and cultural dimension, as illustrated by the narratives of origin 
written at various points in the history of anthropology, for example those 
of Bronisław malinowski, Claude Lévi ‑Strauss, maurice godelier or others, 
emphasising a cultural, relational, symbolic or transmissive human being. 
As for the “total” understanding of human beings, Heidegger would have 
criticised marcel mauss for his use of traditional categories (biological, psy‑
chological, etc.), and for the dominant permeation by the “sociocultural”, as 
illustrated by his well ‑known study on the techniques of the body. For Hei‑
degger, it is also a question of the unity of the “being ‑in ‑the ‑world”. But as 
I have just shown, when he evokes “existential determinations”, he is showing 
that they “are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which 
might sometimes be missing, but a primordial coherence [Zusammenhaug] is 
woven in them which constitutes the totality of the structural whole that we 
are seeking” (Heidegger, 2010a: 191). Furthermore, anthropology, as a hu‑
man science, cannot reasonably be the synthesis of other disciplines, cannot 
be a study on the human being as a being made up of a body, soul and spirit. 
Heidegger points out that such a science would be imprecise (Heidegger, 
1997: 145–147). this criticism is still made today against an anthropology 
that is too general, too soft.
Heidegger ultimately elaborates a forceful vision of human beings. He does 
not want to consider them as animal organisms, but as “ek ‑sistence”, because 
only humans possess this way of being. After long critical discussions, Hei‑
degger finds this unity in temporality; it is death that Heidegger’s analysis has 
in sight. existence is then not understood as subjectivity, but rather as mortal‑
ity. this idea of existence would provide a foundation for anthropology and re‑
‑justify it. Heidegger accuses the sciences, psychology, anthropology and soci‑
ology of disregarding this unconditional point: Dasein’s understanding of itself 
as mortal. grasping this aspect is crucial. For Heidegger it is “the foundation 
for any biographico ‑historical or ethnologico ‑psychological inquiry into death” 
(Heidegger, 2010a: 247). According to the philosopher, most investigations are 
reduced to giving “information” and overlook the “dying Itself ”, in the sense 
that this term designates “the way of  be ing in which Dasein i s  toward its 
death” (Heidegger, 2010a: 247).
By presenting human beings as existence, considered in their unity as 
temporality, understanding of themselves and mortality, have we not defined 
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anthropology’s “object”? It would be the empirical and theoretical science 
of “existents” as they exist. It would be an existential anthropology with its 
own specificity: to observe existence as the entirety of the human being. 
Whereas social and cultural sociology or anthropology studies the sociocul‑
tural dimension of individuals in their belonging to societies and cultures 
according to various theories and paradigms, existential anthropology would 
study the existentiality of beings. It would describe and conceptualise beings 
who are in the process of existing, that is to say continuing, and therefore 
continuing towards death. It invites comparative descriptions according to 
different parameters: sociocultural parameters of course, but also those relat‑
ing to psychology or different ages, from young children to very old people. 
existential anthropology could thus produce descriptions that are bridges to 
other disciplines studying limited spheres of beings, such as sociology, psy‑
chology, cognitive science and geography. In the face of the infinite number 
of individual acts of existing, an existential anthropology would achieve its 
methodological and conceptual specificity: the observation of singular indi‑
viduals, a meticulous observation of one individual at a time, comparisons 
between existences and theorisation. How can Heidegger help anthropolo‑
gists with this objective?
HeIDegger’S eXIStentIALS
Heidegger thinks:
that anthropology, psychology, and biology all fail to give an unequivocal and onto‑
logically adequate answer to the question of the kind of  be ing of this being that we 
ourselves are (Heidegger, 2010a: 50).
Clarifying the meaning of being, Heidegger continues: “the existential ana‑
lytic of Dasein is prior to any psychology, anthropology, and especially biology” 
(Heidegger, 2010a: 45). thus nearly a century ago, Heidegger pointed out that 
the structure of these disciplines, “(not the ‘scientific attitude’ of those who 
are working to further them), has today become completely questionable and 
needs new impulses which must arise from the ontological problematic” (Hei‑
degger, 2010a: 45).
Heidegger’s goal is not to establish the foundations of anthropology (Hei‑
degger, 2010a: 200). He repeatedly says that his research is not “a concrete 
anthropology” (Heidegger, 2010a: 194) and that he does not want to prac‑
tice this. Is this a fear of the sciences? Contempt for empiricism (monod, 
2009)? We know that Heidegger is particularly attached to his native terri‑
tory. Can this explain his “aversion” to actualist anthropology and his fear 
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of the studies about technology, cities, states, trade, cosmopolitanism, the 
media, etc.? In any case, Heidegger does not claim to consider concrete hu‑
man beings. Indeed he proclaims his rejection of the “ontic” in favour of the 
“ontological”, and his rejection of the empirical in favour of fundamental 
structures, those of Dasein, which he intends to situate far from ontic (that 
is, concrete) manifestations.
Without any doubt, any reference to Heidegger to legitimise an empirical 
anthropology implies a certain twisting of his philosophy. my aim is to attempt 
to convert Heidegger’s thought into anthropology. In this regard, it should be 
noted that Ludwig Binswanger, who in psychiatry was greatly inspired by Hei‑
degger’s analyses, explained what separated him from the philosopher, quoting 
Heidegger’s own words:
unlike fundamental ontology, which sets out to analyse the fundamental structures of 
existence “with explicit orientation toward the problem of being” (“existential analytic 
of Dasein”), the task of ex is tent ia l  anthropolog y is to portray “in their general 
features and connections,” and interpreting “according to their existential structure” 
(Heidegger) the factual existential possibilities, which existence has itself either cho‑
sen, stumbled into or developed in (Binswanger, 2000: 310).
Let us explore what Heidegger calls “existentials”, which are without 
doubt an important tool for an existential anthropology, even if Heidegger 
characterises them as “fundamental structures”, not elements of concrete de‑
scription. Being and time explains the characterisics of Dasein, that is the 
existentials. It is not possible to present all of them here. Among other 
characterisations, Heidegger presents Dasein as surrounded by things and 
tools — this is a well ‑known point (Dreyfus, 1990) — and also as exist‑
ing in a world that is common and shared with others: Dasein is a mit‑
sein, a being with others. In another paragraph of Being and time, Heidegger 
evokes a  “being ‑in ‑the ‑world”, which experiences “moods” (Heidegger, 
2010a: 134): moroseness, monotony, dullness causing Dasein to be perceived 
as a “burden”. the euphoric mood, which can soothe, “discloses the burden‑
some character of Dasein” (Heidegger, 2010a: 134). the human being thus 
experiences “throwness”: “We shall call this character of being of Dasein 
which is veiled in its whence and whither, but in itself all the more openly 
disclosed, this ‘that it is’, the throwness  [Geworfenheit] of this being into 
its there” (Heidegger 2010a: 135). Also, depending on how it is “attuned”, 
“Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities […] in terms of which it is always already attuned” 
(Heidegger 2010a: 148).
And this is why “as everyday being ‑with ‑one ‑another, Dasein stands 
in subser v ience to others. It itself is not” (Heidegger, 2010a: 126). 
Dasein drifts into the “they”, which has its ways of being, particularly 
234 Albert PIETTE
“averageness” (Heidegger, 2010a: 127). “We enjoy ourselves,” Heidegger 
continues:
and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and 
art the way they see and judge. But we also withdraw from the “great mass” the way 
they withdraw, we find shocking what they find shocking (Heidegger, 2010a: 127).
In the casualness of day ‑to ‑day life, the “myself ”, which is always in need 
of “being”, gets lost, disburdened of its existence. According to Heidegger’s 
interpretation, Dasein lacks self ‑appropriation; it is not itself.
In this way, the they disburdens Dasein in its everydayness. not only that; but dis‑
burdening it of its being, the they accommodates Dasein in its tendency to take things 
easily and make them easy. And since the they constantly accommodates Dasein by dis‑
burdening its being [Seinsentlastung], it retains and entrenches its stubborn dominance 
(Heidegger, 2010a: 127–128).
Being ‑in ‑the ‑world also unfolds “in the mode of an evasive turning away” 
(Heidegger, 2010a: 136). thus Dasein ignore itself through the everyday blind‑
ness of life. this is Dasein’s “falling prey” (Heidegger, 2010a: 175), as it is 
scattered in the “they”, ready to the “dispersion”: these are important charac‑
terisations of “the everydayness of Dasein” (Heidegger, 2010a: 167). Heidegger 
clarifies what he means by “idle talk”: “gossiping” and “passing the word along” 
(Heidegger, 2010a: 168). Added to the “groundlessness of idle talk” is curios‑
ity, a way of meeting the world, “the tendency toward ‘seeing’” (Heidegger, 
2010a: 170), going from novelty to novelty, not in order to experience wonder 
but “just in order to have known” (Heidegger, 2010a: 172). more precisely, 
Heidegger says curiosity is made up of two factors, “not  ‑stay ing in the sur‑
rounding world taken care of and distract ion  by new possibilities”. And this 
generates the “never dwelling anywhere”: “a new kind of being of everyday 
Dasein, one in which it constantly uproots itself ” (Heidegger, 2010a: 173). 
Heidegger says that all of this “reveals something like a flight of Dasein from 
itself ” (Heidegger, 2010a: 184). the “turning away” results from anxiety in 
the face of being ‑in ‑the ‑world (Heidegger, 2010a: 186). But this can re‑
‑emerge in the middle of “falling prey”, when “Dasein gets tangled up 
[verfängt] in itself ” (Heidegger, 2010a: 178). this creates a whirling effect 
revealing “the movement of throwing and the movement of throwness” (Hei‑
degger, 2010a: 179).
What is one to think of this glimpse of a few existentials? It seems very 
symptomatic and reinforces Claude romano’s diagnosis:
the human being, he who is born and dies, he who has a body and possesses a gender 
difference, never stops haunting Dasein like a burdensome double from which Dasein 
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struggles to free itself. Anthropology continues to haunt fundamental ontology, de‑
spite its author’s repeated denials. the reputedly erroneous interpretation, which sees 
in the analytic of Dasein a variant of philosophical anthropology, cannot simply be 
a “misinterpretation” (romano, 2010: 464).
Pierre Hadot seems even more enthusiastic when he writes that Heidegger 
“excellently describes what is called everyday life” (Hadot, 2001: 205). the 
characteristics of Dasein are most certainly those of the human being that we 
are and know. though Heidegger presents his Dasein as an abstraction, it looks 
like a very concrete human being. moreover, many philosophers have not failed 
to point out that Heidegger’s point of departure remains the human being. 
Husserl himself saw Being and time as philosophical anthropology, to the great 
displeasure of Heidegger, who wished to situate his work on a more funda‑
mental level. Hubert Dreyfus suggested that the best way to understand what 
Heidegger meant by Dasein was to think of the expression “human being”, 
which designates a form of being that is characteristic of all human beings, and 
also of any person in particular (Dreyfus, 1990: 14). Heidegger himself injected 
ambiguities that could potentially be fruitful for anthropologists: “Dasein ex‑
ists. Furthermore, Dasein is the being which I myself always am” (Heidegger, 
2010a: 53).. It is even one of its essential characteristics: “it is essentially pos‑
sible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself ”. Heidegger distinguishes this 
from “the inauthenticity” of “this everyday indifference of Dasein averageness” 
(Heidegger, 2010a: 42–43).
thus I believe it is important to not widen the potential gap between 
Heideggerian interpretations and empirical interpretations, to continue forg‑
ing the link between Heidegger and the human sciences (e.g., Kiverstein 
&  Wheeler, 2012), to find conceptual leads in the existential analytic and (why 
not?) to search for new existential conceptualisations based on empiricism. 
even if Heidegger does not want to practice a concrete anthropology, he evokes 
it because it is possible. moreover, he points out that, “with a view to a possible 
anthropology,” his analysis, that of Being and time, supplies “a few ‘parts’, al‑
though not inessentials ones” (Heidegger, 2010a: 17). He even presents Dasein 
as a theme and possible object “of scientific investigations”, in the same way 
as language, space, nature or history (Heidegger, 2010a: 9).2 At the Zollikon 
Seminars in Zurich, where Heidegger met with doctors and psychologists to 
explore the foundation of the ontic ‑ontological, existentiell ‑existential distinc‑
tion, Heidegger himself accepted the idea of an “ontic anthropology”:
this means that there would have to be an entire future discipline with the 
task of delineating the demonstrable existentiell [existenziellen] phenomena of 
2  See the work of Cristian Ciocan for a very enlightening reflection on the example of 
biology (Ciocan, 2001). 
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the sociohistorical and individual Da ‑sein in the sense of ont ic  anthropology 
bearing the stamp of the analytic of Da ‑sein (Heidegger, 2001: 125).
At certain moments, Heidegger also indicates that this ontic anthropology:
must be oriented toward the concrete historical existence of the contemporary human 
being, that is, toward the existing human being in today’s industrial society (Hei‑
degger, 2001: 125).
And Heidegger adds that a subdivision is possible, into “a normal an‑
thropology and Daseinanalytic pathology related to the former” (Heidegger, 
2001: 125). During these seminars, he furtively noted the “correlative relation‑
ship” (Heidegger, 2001: 207) between his existential analytic and anthropol‑
ogy. He also admitted that it is possible to consider existentials as “the content 
[of the analytic of Dasein]. they exactly co ‑determine the concrete description 
of a state of anxiety in a particular human being” (Heidegger, 2001: 205). 
As Philippe Cabestan and Françoise Dastur have pointed out, Dasein analysis, 
which has until now mainly found application in psychology and psychiatry, 
designates:
the description of phenomena that concretely appear in a singular Dasein; it is a de‑
scription that, while being directed towards someone who exists, is necessarily oriented 
by fundamental determinations updated by the analytic of Dasein (Cabestan & Dastur, 
2011: 10).
eXIStentIAL AntHrOPOLOgY: A BrOAD emPIrICAL HOrIZOn
existential anthropology would thus have its research theme: human beings, 
who are alone capable of questioning the idea of existence and of knowing 
their finiteness. When Heidegger describes Dasein, let us assume that what 
he is speaking of is the human being and human beings. this shift of Dasein 
into existents is not a trivial matter. It consists in empiricising the former in 
the latter, singling it out as an empirical unit. What Heidegger presents as 
“two kinds of being” (Heidegger, 2010a: 42) — getting lost in inauthenticity 
and finding itself again in authenticity — now potentially becomes a series of 
swings between two activities, or a reciprocal modulation at moment t. this 
is what Catherine malabou has pointed out in different words. She is against 
reducing Heidegger’s thought to a philosophy of the identical, and she very 
strongly emphasises the swings from one mode to another:
between authenticity, or the proper, and inauthenticity or the improper: the modifica‑
tion of care into preoccupation, preoccupation into care, the “they” into the ownmost 
power to be, the latter into everydayness and fallenness (malabou, 2011: 205).
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What would an existential anthropology involve? In observation research 
it is tempting to view these existentials as heuristic guides. this point of view 
is immediately productive, giving rise to new observation themes. Heidegger 
would offer “typical attitudes” or “typical properties” of existence, “a kind of 
purified narrative of the human attitude” (Salanskis, 1997: 17), which is im‑
portant to compare to an observed reality. the anthropologist would begin 
with one or another of the existentials and would observe in concrete situa‑
tions their modes of apparition, realisation and disappearance according to mo‑
ments and in the continuity of the everyday life: care, preoccupation, anxiety, 
fear, understanding, curiosity, distraction, etc. these are ways of existing, of 
being ‑in ‑the ‑world and being ‑temporal, and it is a question of observing and 
describing them in detail.
In such a detailed perspective, a moment of presence cannot be reduced 
solely to practical environmental engagement, to skills in an activity and to 
the relevance of attentive perception. An example of this would be tim Ingold 
who describes “capacities of attention and response that have been develop‑
mentally embodied through practice and experience” (Ingold, 2011: 11). It 
seems to me that the empirical translation of Heidegger’s existentials covers 
a much wider anthropological territory than the “dwelling perspective” which 
Ingold defines as “founded on the premise that the forms humans build, 
whether in the imagination or on the ground, arise within the currents of 
their involved activity, in the specific relational contexts of their engagement 
with their surroundings” (Ingold, 2011: 10). An anthropology of existences 
should also be enriched by observations and descriptions of anxiety, oblivion, 
non ‑consciousness, boredom and also doing nothing with something. to this 
end, Heidegger attributes to Dasein characteristics that I believe are essential 
for answering the question “what does it mean to exist?”. He of course as‑
sociates everyday being — which is necessarily “in ‑the ‑world”, therefore in 
a situation — with worry and anxiety, but also with indifference and distanti‑
ality. He presents a human being that is “initially and for the most part” (Hei‑
degger, 2010a: 126) — an adverbial phrase that contains a very clear empirical 
expression — disburbened of its being in a world that is already there, a kind 
of horizon of pre ‑constituted understanding (Heidegger, 2010a: 127–128). 
Heidegger is not mistaken:
this indifference [Indifferenz] of the everydayness of Dasein is not nothing; but rather, 
a positive phenomenal characteristic. All existing is how it is out of this kind of being, 
and back into it (Heidegger, 2010a: 43).
these characteristics are not without connections to the minimal hu‑
man being (Piette, 2012), who delays, leaves unfinished and suspends, whose 
cognitive economy, docility, fluidity and distraction mitigate, moderate and 
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modalise the meaning at play, the preoccupation, exigency and burden of 
existence, anxiety and “resoluteness” as a lucid way to think something out 
to its end (Heidegger, 2010a: 305). this would imply observing, describing 
and understanding the intermingled portions of strangeness and tension on 
the one hand, familiarity and tranquillity on the other, as they arise in the 
course of everyday life. Which attitudes are relevant for understanding what 
is happening in specific situations and at particular moments? “this is why 
the emergence of a mode is possible only through the modification of another 
that is thereby torn or caused to burst. A mode,” writes Catherine malabou, 
“does not «eliminate» what it replaces” (malabou, 2011: 222). On the forms 
of coexistence between these different modes, a vast observation space opens 
up to the anthropologist.
It is this practice of observation and introspection that can be called phe‑
nomenography, rather than ethnography, which is reserved primarily for the 
observation of groups or interactions (Piette, 2012; Piette, 2015). this moves 
us further away from Heidegger, who was not very fond of “life experiences”, 
as I have pointed out. the word “phenomenography” is significant in two 
senses. through its etymology, it designates the study of that which ap‑
pears: the forms, gestures, movements and positions of human beings. And 
in connection with the word phenomenology, it designates a method, the 
empirical counterpoint of phenomenology, as studies of experiences, flows 
of consciousness, states of mind. Does phenomenology not too directly fo‑
cus on essences through examples trimmed of their contingent details and 
concrete situations? Pierre Vermersch has pointed out that Husserl sought 
to clarify and purify his examples, using a procedure that is not empirical but 
eidetic, favouring intuitive data, also accepting imagined cases, attributing no 
importance to factual contingencies, with the goal of ridding life ‑experience 
examples of their vagueness or characteristic impurities (Vermersch, 1999). 
But there would also be the risk that phenomenography, transformed into 
a “psychophenomenology”, would narrowly focus on one single activity, for 
example doubt, perspective or intuition, just as cognitive psychology too often 
focuses solely on cognitive mechanisms that are relevant in certain natural 
situations, even artificial ones. When pursuing an existential understanding, 
such a perspective only makes sense if it is one level of observation that is 
integrated with other levels in order to observe the continuity of presences in 
a situation.
Such observations reveal ever ‑mitigated existences. thus the “privative ex‑
pressions”, as Heidegger called them (Heidegger, 2010a: 75), help, for ex‑
ample, to draw attention to the restrictions of being ‑in ‑the ‑world alongside 
other humans and objects in such a way that they do not rea l ly  attract one’s 
attention. then why is it that, at a given instant, in a situation, human be‑
ings are not “actually turning toward what is talked about in the discourse” 
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(Heidegger, 2010a: 215)? And when are they discerning and vigilant? At which 
moments and in what way are they concentrating, feeling tense, experiencing 
emotion in a situation? the anthropological exercise can consist in following 
and describing a human being based on what happens from one situation to 
another, the succession and also the simultaneity of his modes of engagement 
and distance, of lucidity and concealment, his modes of being present ahead 
of himself, of already being elsewhere in relation to the place where he stands, 
of not confronting himself, states of busyness, preoccupation and tension, of 
activity and passivity. It seems to me that this would imply understanding 
the difference between states of mind, real ‑life experiences (which should not 
be neglected despite Heidegger’s misgivings about them), similar to “moods” 
revealing “how one is and is coming along” (Heidegger, 2010a: 134), between 
“scenes” where consequential actions unfold and “offstage” situations, transi‑
tions between scenes involving different concerns. Is not there indeed a differ‑
ence between existence and experience? the “experience of ” refers to a mo‑
ment, an activity, a “relation to”. It implies looking for relevant elements of 
this experience of (sickness, power, music, etc.). existence moves the focus onto 
the existent being who is living this experience, and onto his entire volume of 
being. this point of view makes it possible to observe that the human being 
is more than just this experience at the moment he experiences it, and that he 
continues through other activities after this experience.
What more does this human being not do? He does not confront the idea of 
death; he sidesteps it. He does not consider it imminent; he prefers distraction 
and tranquillity, Heidegger repeats. existing is indeed accompanied by a kind 
of negative reserve that takes different forms depending on the situation. In 
a situation, how does an ageing or very sick being think or not think about 
death? How does he then continue being “towards death”? And what about 
someone who has decided to commit suicide and is preparing the act? What is 
he like? How do tension and tiredness combine within him? Because it is also 
possible to be “wanting ‑to ‑have ‑a conscience” (Heidegger, 2010a: 296) and to 
engage in “authentic being a self ” (Heidegger, 2010a: 298). When does this 
happen? It is the anthropologist’s task to watch the human being in situations: 
dispensing himself, lucidly anticipating death, but also assuming a “heritage”, 
a constancy of self, a way of being in the present, past and future, with variable 
intensities — to repeat a few of the modes described by Heidegger (Dastur, 
1998).
Phenomenography consists of these kinds of exercises in observation and 
detailed description. We must admit, along with milan Kundera, that:
all the great existential themes Heidegger analyzes in Being and time — considering 
them to have been neglected by all earlier european philosophy — had been unveiled, 
displayed, illuminated by four centuries of the european novel (Kundera, 2005: 5).
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But discoveries are infinite, and above all anthropology sees itself as 
a transmissible science, with observation methods, concepts, as well as com‑
parison and theorisation modalities. Fortunately Heidegger notes that “Da‑
sein analysis as ontic science would be an entirely new science” (Heidegger, 
2001: 207). In any case, existential anthropology would consist in describing, 
in the course of life, the accomplishment of existentials. How do human be‑
ings concretely exist, thrown into the world and time, given over to time, 
discovering temporality, characterised by a set of existential structures? And 
that being over there, or this being over here: it is quite difficult not to see 
them as living, with a body, gender, age, as young or old, in a familiar or 
challenging situation of one kind or another. If the existential analytic cease‑
lessly claims to be moving further away from the natural being, anthropol‑
ogy should take the reverse approach. I would not conceive of this existential 
anthropology outside of observations and descriptions that are profoundly 
empirical. I would go as far as to say that the anthropological interpretation 
of Heidegger is all the more fruitful if, in the margins, it constantly reminds 
us that only singular beings exist, real individuals to be watched as they ap‑
pear in situations. It is in this empiricist spirit that it would be important 
to “anthropologise”, to “detail” Heideggerian themes, particularly that of 
finitude, and to appropriate that question very perspicaciously raised by Hans 
Blumenberg: “how is it possible that human beings were only able to sur‑
vive?” (Blumenberg, 2011: 489).
As detailed observation of the various swings in everyday situations would 
suggest, this link between the ontic and ontological is realised by human 
beings themselves, as shown above. this even constitutes its essential char‑
acteristic: “it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this be‑
ing is concerned about its very being” (Heidegger, 2010a: 12). It is itself 
a metaphysical questioner of being and existence: “in its being this being is 
concerned about its very being”. In this regard, Pierre Hadot has noted the 
opposition set up by Heidegger “between the ordinary, the banal, and a state 
in which one is conscious of existence […], conscious of being destined for 
death (what he calls being ‑towards ‑death), and therefore conscious of one’s 
finitude” (Hadot, 2001: 205). Pierre Hadot explains:
At that moment, existence takes on a whole different appearance, one that is dis‑
tressing; maybe because of death, but it is also distressing because of the mystery 
that the fact of existing represents […]. I should explain that this opposition 
between the everyday and the authentic absolutely does not mean that one must 
constantly live in the authentic. Human beings live normally and, one might say, 
necessarily in the everyday, but sometimes it can happen that they catch a glimpse 
of existence from a completely different perspective. And that is already a lot” 
(Hadot, 2001: 205).
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this point reminds me of the so ‑called metaphysical questions of children, 
and of the various more or less evasive responses of their parents, encouraging 
them — without necessarily insisting — to “relax” their ontological tension. 
A nice phenomenographic “object” to work on!
therefore, this too is the object of existential anthropology: observing an 
empirical being in its various everyday moods or “affective tones”, understand‑
ing its ontological jumps as well as its swings back into the everyday ontic. 
Humans are special beings, the only ones that question the fact of existing, 
the only ones from which the question of being arises, the only ones for which 
being presents a question. george Steiner expressed it clearly:
And his privilege consists precisely in the fact that he alone experiences existence as 
problematic, that he alone is an ontic presence seeking a relation of understanding to 
the ontological, to ‘Being’ itself (Steiner, 1989: 81).
It is perhaps not insignificant that in Steiner’s little book about Hei‑
degger I found the expression “ontological anthropology”. It is therefore 
regrettable, on the one hand, that metaphysics is not more empirical, that 
its discourse on being is rather abstract and disembodied, and on the other 
hand, that fragments of concrete being are divided between the sciences. In 
both cases, the existent’s concrete entirety is suspended, as well as its ontic 
modalities of existing in finitude. existential anthropology could make this 
its empirical and theoretical theme. It would have to unreservedly maintain 
its methodological course like other sciences, while integrating, even testing, 
that ontological aim of understanding and describing the fact of existing. 
I believe it is obvious that an existential anthropology would study what 
Dasein empirically consists of, in this or that place, in this situation, at that 
moment. “the meaning of being [Sein] of that being [Seienden] we call Da‑
sein will prove to be temporality [Zeitlichkeit]”, as we have seen (Heidegger, 
2010a: 17).
the emphasis that Heidegger places on this temporal dimension necessarily 
and as a matter of priority suggests a methodological position that no longer 
consists in working on thematically chosen activities and situations, but either 
on moments described in gestural and mental details, or — and especially — 
on the continuity between activities, moments and situations. this refocuses 
attention away from relations and forms of coordination in an activity, towards 
presence modalities and modes of consciousness or unconsciousness. And when 
Heidegger links this temporal dimension of Dasein with its capacity for “being 
away” (Heidegger, 1995: 64) in the form of absence and oblivion, then an em‑
pirically essential set of themes asserts itself: forms of consciousness and lucid‑
ity, the thoughts that are involved in an action, those that are associated with 
it, as well as other thoughts. But what do human beings have in their heads? 
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What do they think when they are here and there? the detailed observations 
can lead towards details of presence, peripheral gestures, wandering thoughts, 
ways of being active, and at the same time (this is crucial) of forms of repose, of 
being passive. Fundamentally, it is a matter of describing the presence ‑absence 
modalities of human beings. this resonates with the notions “minor mode” 
and “reposity”, which designate, in various forms, the passivity intrinsic to the 
presence of human beings.
FOCuS On InDIVIDuAL eXIStenCeS
Of course, based on Heidegger’s discourse it would be possible to consider 
the relational and social dimension of Dasein, previously glimpsed.3 But what 
is the use of reading Heidegger if this is only for the purpose of returning 
to this widely accepted point, which the social sciences have amply explored? 
Heidegger certainly presents a Dasein that is always “beyond itself ”. From 
the point of view of existential anthropology, I prefer to change the ques‑
tion: what is it like to be this existent in relation, with its constantly shifting 
way of being? What are its affective tones and states of mind, its actions and 
gestures?
Would we not be at the heart of anthropology: the individual as an em‑
pirical unit? Heidegger of course refuses to conceive of a closed self; on the 
contrary he conceives of a being that is in relation, a being ‑with. But he also 
specifies: “An I is always this being, and not others” (Heidegger, 2010a: 114). 
As François raffoul explains well, no one can die in one’s place, and death 
is that by which Dasein belongs solely to itself (raffoul, 1999). existence is 
intrinsically separate and not sharable. this reinforces the principle of sin‑
gularity: a world of “solitudes”, also engaged in relations, whose singularities 
are irreducible to the relational and interactional dimensions of situations. 
Concretely, in existential anthropology, this would imply that when two 
relata are engaged in relations, the anthropologist should focus on one of 
these, on each of them separately, as they act, speak, interact, think and 
feel in matters that concern this present relation, and a l so in matters that 
do not concern it directly. After their encounter, the two relata continue 
3  In a key text in existential anthropology, michael Jackson (2005) makes fewer references 
to Heidegger than to Jean ‑Paul Sartre and Pierre Bourdieu. Confronted by critical moments, 
individuals are especially interpreted as showing their ability to respond and create, based on the 
past as well. understanding subjectivity is its major axis, with a direct focus on relations. nigel 
rapport (2012) offers an anthropology that stretches between the singularity of individuals 
and the specificity of the human condition, with a rather nietzschean emphasis on the active 
and creative human being. One can find a dialogue between social anthropology and a few 
Heidegger’s ideas in James F. Weiner (2001) from an Australian fieldwork.
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to exist, each encountering other relata. Ideally, the anthropologist would 
continue following one of the two. Basing observations on an empirical unit 
does not necessarily imply that it is conceived as subject or cogito. this in‑
dividual is in fact always out of sync with himself, ahead of himself, beyond 
himself, as Heidegger would say. this point also presents a major problem 
in the task of describing moods, states of mind, thoughts, sensations and 
feelings, variable intensities, various modes of consciousness and especially 
non ‑consciousness.
thus existential anthropology clarifies its objective: to describe and con‑
sider existing, continuing solitudes — an aim that moves us away from the 
social sciences, in which the individual is never alone, and is even less sin‑
gular, always linked and connected, in groups and networks, dominating 
these people, dominated by those people, belonging, assessing, evaluating, 
etc. I would observe not the “between” of relations or interactions, but the 
relata in the process of existing, the existences not tied to one activity but 
continuing in time (raffoul, 1999). An existence is neither a substance nor 
a fixed substratum, but a presence that is always mobile. this does not rule 
out pinpointing — in these preoccupied or disburdened solitudes — social 
strata accumulated over the course of life trajectories (Piette, 2012). It is also 
on the basis of the singular existence that fundamental questions necessar‑
ily re ‑emerge: in a situation, where is the social, where is society, where is 
culture? this is not a matter of putting oneself “in other people’s shoes”, 
with a view to understanding a group, culture or mentality, but watching, 
observing someone, one individual at a time, to understand what it means to 
be this or that person. Heidegger adds this: “Dasein does not exist as the sum 
of the momentary realities of experiences that succeed each other and disap‑
pear” (Heidegger, 2010a: 374). the fact that these individuals are not just 
sums but “entireties”, as Heidegger writes, implies also showing that at each 
moment in a situation, humans are like “monsters”4 laden with accumulated 
and interlinked presences, actions and past situations, and, to a lesser extent, 
future presences, actions and situations. that which comes from the past, 
and social trajectories infiltrates with variable intensities into the daily modes 
of presence, actions, decisions or choices. In a presence, there are also more 
or less restless thoughts, as well as mental images linked to actions in both 
the past and future. Here ‑and ‑now, human presence makes itself singular, in 
a light and obvious way, despite what it is carrying, or by virtue of this. But 
it can also grow heavy and become strained, experienced to varying degrees as 
a weight because of what it is carrying, or despite this. Such is the presence 
of each human, always modulated according to variable doses of lightness and 
4  In dictionaries, a “monster” is that which has a prodigious, unusual size and intensity, 
and shocks reason.
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heaviness. numerous rarely conducted observation exercises are possible: at 
instant t and in continuity, what is an individual like when he has an inten‑
tion, when he deliberates, decides, prefers, wants, hesitates, when he is highly 
or little conscious of his action, of his presence? Who observes, in a situation, 
those moments that philosophers are fond of, but only as part of examples 
that are often removed from any context: effort, will, decision, choice, inten‑
tion, belief, the beginning of an action, the continuity of an action sequence, 
passivity, boredom, oblivion…? It seems to me that this presents a broad 
empirical horizon for the existential anthropology that can only be associated 
with meticulous methodologies.
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